The Doctrine of Trade Not Aid: Can the United States Pursue Sovereign and Equitable Partnerships with Africa? BY SHEMI ESQUIRE
Is the recent surge in high-profile U.S. diplomatic engagement with Africa marked by both spectacle and historical amnesia?
President Trump participates in a multilateral lunch with visiting African Leaders in the State Dining Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., on July 9, 2025.
Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images
The Doctrine of Trade Not Aid: Can the United States Pursue Sovereign and Equitable Partnerships with Africa?
BY SHEMI ESQUIRE
Is Diplomatic Amnesia Undermining Partnership?
“For years, Africa has been the footstool of colonialism and imperialism, exploitation and degradation. Those days are gone and gone forever.”
— Nelson Mandela, 1990¹
The recent surge in high profile United States diplomatic visits to Africa has generated more awkwardness than assurance. At one point during a highly publicized meeting, President Trump reportedly turned to the Liberian President and asked, “You speak good English?” The irony would be amusing if not so revealing. Liberia was founded by freed American slaves in 1847, and English is its official language.²
But beyond the chuckle, this moment raises a serious question. To what extent does a lack of awareness among United States officials impact the equality of diplomatic negotiations?
Does this absence of historical understanding inadvertently reproduce colonial assumptions about African states?
Are Treaties Voluntary Under International Law?
The United States administration’s shift from multilateral diplomacy to direct transactionalism calls for legal scrutiny. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties must be entered into freely and in good faith, known in law as pacta sunt servanda.³
When mineral access becomes the implicit or explicit currency for diplomatic recognition or military assistance, the voluntary nature of these arrangements is called into question. This commodification of sovereignty violates international legal norms, especially the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as codified in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803.⁴
This resolution affirms that nations have the right to control their natural wealth in accordance with their development goals and well being.
It also insists that this sovereignty must be exercised through mutual respect among states based on sovereign equality, a norm that has since attained the status of customary international law.⁵
How Do African Legal Frameworks Define Sovereignty?
African legal instruments reinforce these principles. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the Africa Mining Vision, adopted in 2009, articulate a vision of mineral led development that is broad, equitable, and sustainable.⁶ The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights further protects the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources, mandating that dispossession must be lawful and benefit the people.⁷
Does the Mini Summit Weaken Regional Unity?
The July 2025 White House Mini Summit revealed the transactional nature of current United States Africa engagement.
Five resource rich countries Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal were reportedly encouraged to adopt United States foreign policy positions in return for mining contracts and investment pledges.⁸ This undermines the African Union’s regional unity goals and potentially violates the principle of sovereign equality outlined in Article 2 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter.⁹
Is Peace Used as a Bargaining Chip?
The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo illustrates more troubling dynamics. Reports allege that the United States facilitated prisoner exchanges and ceasefire negotiations in return for access to cobalt and lithium reserves critical for green technologies.¹⁰ While peacebuilding is a legitimate foreign policy aim, tying it to mineral concessions raises the specter of coercion, particularly when such deals pressure governments into becoming willing victims of diplomatic leverage.
The International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua v. United States case, defined unlawful intervention as actions that undermine a state’s freedom to decide domestic matters.¹¹ Such agreements could be invalid under Article 52 of the Vienna Convention, which voids treaties procured through coercion or the threat of force.¹²
Do Trade Sanctions Breach WTO and BIT Rules?
United States trade penalties against democratic BRICS countries like South Africa and Nigeria, while offering preferential terms to autocratic mineral suppliers, may breach Most Favoured Nation clauses in bilateral investment treaties.¹³
These clauses mandate equal treatment for all treaty partners. Additionally, discriminatory tariffs could violate Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, exposing the United States to potential World Trade Organization dispute settlement proceedings.¹⁴
Can Multilateral Models Provide an Alternative?
In contrast, the Lobito Corridor initiative in Angola presents a better model. Jointly funded by the United States International Development Finance Corporation, the African Development Bank, and European partners, the project focuses on infrastructure that enhances regional trade and supports long term development goals.¹⁵
Similarly, the European Union’s Cotonou and Samoa Agreements with African, Caribbean, and Pacific states prioritize human rights and sustainable development without coercive conditionality.¹⁶ These frameworks respect sovereignty while promoting inclusive economic growth.
How Do China and Russia Engage Differently?
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has financed over 170 billion United States dollars in African infrastructure, although criticism over debt burdens remains.¹⁷ Unlike the United States, China often structures loans without overt political conditions, focusing instead on long term logistics and energy corridors. Russia’s Africa Corps offers military support in exchange for mining rights, and Kremlin backed forces are now embedded in several Sahel states.¹⁸ While both countries pursue strategic interests, their rhetoric emphasizes sovereign partnership rather than regime change or democratic preconditions.
“The events now taking place in Africa constitute the most serious threat to the peace, security and the freedom of the people of this Continent. For years now, the global West have lived on raw materials and cheap labour from Asia and Africa. The imperial powers turn their eyes on Africa.”
— Nelson Mandela, 1990¹
When Does Coercion Breach International Norms?
The United Nations Charter’s Article 2 paragraph 7 and the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations forbid states from interfering in the domestic affairs of others through political or economic pressure.¹⁹ According to the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, even indirect coercion or facilitation of wrongful acts can trigger liability.²⁰
Do Bilateral Deals Undermine Development?
Advocates of bilateralism argue that such deals are efficient. Yet the African Union warns that direct mining agreements often produce isolated enclave economies with little benefit for national development.²¹
These arrangements hinder industrial linkages and regional integration, perpetuating dependency instead of empowerment.
The International Law Commission stresses that treaties must be implemented in good faith and aligned with their stated object and purpose.²² Bilateral deals negotiated under unequal conditions rarely meet that standard.
What Reforms Can Promote Sovereign Trade?
Multilateral agreements must be strengthened. Resource contracts should be publicly disclosed and ratified by national parliaments. Bilateral agreements should explicitly support African Union integration and economic transformation. Human rights, labor protections, and environmental safeguards must be enforceable and monitored. Capacity building within African governments is vital. Legal and technical training will enable African negotiators to demand equitable terms and avoid becoming willing victims of coercion masquerading as partnership.
What’s at Stake?
The core question is not whether engagement between the United States and Africa should occur, but whether it respects the legal principles of sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit. As South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa said:
*“Our minerals are not bargaining chips. They are engines of transformation and Africa must refine them for African use.”*²³
“Africa shed her blood and surrendered the lives of her children so that all her children could be free. She gave of her limited wealth and resources so that all of Africa should be liberated. If freedom was the crown which the fighters of liberation sought to place on the head of mother Africa, let the upliftment, the happiness, prosperity and comfort of her children be the jewel of the crown.”
— Nelson Mandela, 1990¹
If the doctrine of “trade not aid” is to retain credibility, it must embody mutual respect and lawful engagement, not coercive advantage under the guise of benevolence.
Footnotes:
¹ Nelson Mandela, Address to the Pan African Parliament, Midrand, 1990.
² Britannica, “Liberia | Language, Currency, Religion, History,” accessed July 2025.
³ Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 26 and 52 (1969).
⁴ UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962).
⁵ Ibid.
⁶ Africa Mining Vision, African Union, 2009.
⁷ African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 21 (1981).
⁸ White House Press Briefing, July 2025.
⁹ UN Charter, Article 2(1).
¹⁰ Reuters, “US Brokers Ceasefire Deal with DRC in Exchange for Mineral Access,” May 2025.
¹¹ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, ICJ Reports 1986.
¹² Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 52 (1969).
¹³ Bilateral Investment Treaties (US–South Africa, US–Nigeria).
¹⁴ GATT 1994, Article I; WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.
¹⁵ USAID and African Development Bank, Report on Lobito Corridor, 2024.
¹⁶ European Commission, Partnership Agreement with ACP States (Cotonou and Samoa Agreements).
¹⁷ China Africa Research Initiative, “Belt and Road Financing in Africa,” 2024.
¹⁸ Moscow Times, “Russia’s Africa Corps Replaces Wagner,” July 2025.
¹⁹ UN GA Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970).
²⁰ ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2001).
²¹ African Union Policy Brief on Sovereign Resource Governance, 2023.
²² International Law Commission, Guide to Treaty Practice and Interpretation (2021).
²³ President Cyril Ramaphosa, Speech to Pan African Parliament, June 2025.